People have moral beliefs. By that we mean that people believe that some things are morally right and some things are morally wrong in much the same way that they believe that other propositions about the state of the world are factually right or factually wrong. In the absence of pressure to justify our positions, we seem to experience prescriptive beliefs like "capital punishment is wrong" in much the same way as we experience descriptive beliefs like "cutting taxes stimulates the economy."
Interesting differences emerge, however, when people are required to justify their moral beliefs. Moral beliefs have a more complicated relationship with "facts" than other types of beliefs. In this talk, we will focus precisely on this relationship between moral and factual belief.
We will make the case that people are both moral intuitionists and moral realists: that our beliefs about right and wrong are more often a product of affective reaction than deliberative cognitive processing, but that nonetheless we feel the need to justify the "truth" of our moral beliefs with reference to some form of evidence. This becomes tricky for people when faced with classic forms of moral dilemmas, in which the superficial facts of the matter suggest that no course of action is without morally undesirable consequences. It is in these cases, we will argue, that factual beliefs come into moral play, and are often distorted in ways that help to minimize the experience of moral conflict. As such, people rarely make true "moral stands," asserting that some course of action is morally right, even when facts suggest that other actions are more practically advantageous. Rather, people tend to bring their factual beliefs in line with their moral intuitions, such that the right course of action morally becomes the right course of action practically as well. Our analysis complicates simple distinctions between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist judgment, and identifies a key contributor to the intractability of many moral and political conflicts. It is difficult to resolve differences of opinion, when everyone has their own facts.
